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Foreword | Armed robbery is a diverse, 
heterogeneous crime shaped by the 
presence or absence of a wide array of 
characteristics. Therefore, effectively 
preventing armed robbery requires a 
good understanding of the nature of the 
offence. Previous attempts to understand 
armed robbery have focused on the 
offender, primarily by interviewing 
incarcerated offenders to gain insight into 
their motivations and planning. However, 
this approach overlooks the unique 
vulnerabilities associated with the victim 
and/or the location of the offence.
In this paper, four armed robbery 
profiles have been constructed, based on 
information contained in qualitative police 
narratives supplied as part of the AIC’s 
National Armed Robbery Monitoring 
Program. These profiles highlight the 
way in which the location, environment 
and offender interact to shape individual 
incidents of armed robbery in Australia 
and may assist to inform prevention 
strategies.
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In 2010, approximately 5,000 individuals and organisations reported being the victim of 
armed robbery (Borzycki & Fuller 2014). After assault and sexual assault, armed robbery 
is the third most common violent crime reported; a trend that has remained consistent 
over the last 10 years (AIC 2013). However, armed robbery is unique when compared with 
other types of violence due to its overlap with property crime. Specifically, while armed 
robbery involves the use or threat of force or violence, the primary purpose is to deprive the 
individual or organisation of their property (Pink 2011). A such, an incident of armed robbery 
can have both immediate and long-term psychological and economic ramifications for the 
victim. Therefore, the prevention of armed robbery remains a key focus of business groups, 
as well as law enforcement agencies.
In order to develop effective crime prevention strategies, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
heterogeneous nature of armed robbery. Incidents of armed robbery can vary depending 
on whether the victim was a person or an organisation, whether the offender was armed 
with a knife, firearm or other weapon, or whether the offence occurred on the street or 
in a commercial premise (Borzycki & Fuller 2014; Mouzos & Borzycki 2003). Therefore, 
understanding the qualitative differences between incidents is vital in order to avoid 
implementing ineffective and generic approaches to armed robbery prevention.
Previous profiles of armed robbery have almost exclusively focused on the offender. 
Research conducted in Australia and overseas has examined the characteristics and 
motivations of offenders in order to explain the variations in robbery (see Gabor et al. 1987; 
Matthews 2002; Mouzos & Borzycki 2003; Nugent et al. 1989; Walsh 1986). However, while 
such an approach has merits as an investigative tool, it is limited in its presentation of armed 
robbery more generally. Specifically, these profiles fail to appropriately capture the influence 
of the environment and the victim on the offender. It would therefore be useful, when looking 
to prospectively prevent crime, to broaden this focus and incorporate not just the offender 
but also vulnerabilities associated with particular victims and/or locations.
No. 479 September 2014
2  |  Australian Institute of Criminology
The aim of the current research is to 
develop overarching profiles of armed 
robberies based on the locations in which 
they occur. The four profiles reflect the ways 
locations and their environments interact 
with the offender to shape the nature of 
the armed robbery incident. The purpose 
is to provide a better understanding of the 
unique vulnerabilities associated with each 
category that may then assist practitioners 
implementing crime prevention across the 
different locations.
Profiling armed robbery
The decision to profile incidents by location 
has its foundations in a routine activity theory 
(RAT) of crime (Cohen & Felson 1979). At its 
core, RAT proposes that crime occurs when 
three elements converge at the same time 
and in the same geographical location—
the presence of a motivated offender and 
a suitable target, as well as the absence 
of a capable guardian. RAT underscores 
many crime prevention initiatives, where the 
primary aim is to manipulate one or more 
of these elements, therefore rendering an 
offence less likely to occur.
Until now, armed robbery classifications have 
focused almost exclusively on characterising 
different offenders and their motivations. 
Early work by Gabor et al. (1987) identified 
four types of Canadian robbers—chronic, 
professional, intensive and occasional 
offenders. The groups were distinguished 
predominately by the frequency of their 
offending. Chronic and professional offenders 
had longer careers and committed a high 
volume of robberies (more than 20 over the 
course of the career). However, these two 
groups could be differentiated from each 
other by their level of planning and the level of 
diversification into other crimes. Specifically, 
professionals planned more and were less 
likely to diversify. By contrast, intensive and 
occasional offenders committed smaller 
numbers of robberies and were characterised 
by a lack of planning, shorter criminal careers 
and higher rates of desistance. Intensive 
offenders particularly tended to commit the 
majority of their robberies in a short period of 
time; sometimes within a few weeks (Gabor 
et al. 1987).
More recent classifications have 
differentiated offenders by their level of 
planning and professionalism. For example, 
in the United Kingdom, Alison et al. (2000) 
used underworld terminology to distinguish 
between three types of offenders—robin’s 
men, bandits and cowboys. Robin’s men 
were the more professional offenders, while 
bandits engaged in planning but were more 
likely to resort to violence when the robbery 
moved beyond their control. Cowboys 
committed armed robberies to fund existing 
drug habits or while under the influence of 
drugs (Alison et al. 2000). Matthews (2002) 
constructed an alternative classification 
after interviewing 340 convicted robbers. 
He provided these insights into their 
offending behaviour:
• Amateurs tended to engage in 
unplanned and disorganised armed 
robberies. These offenders were 
characterised by a lack of experience 
as well as a history of attempted but 
not completed robberies. Compared 
with the other two categories, amateurs 
commonly had issues with or directly 
used illicit drugs during their offending.
• Intermediates engaged in more planning 
than amateurs, while also tending 
to have more experience. Matthews 
identified a further two subcategories—
diversifiers and developers. Diversifiers 
were not exclusively involved with armed 
robbery and were also likely to commit 
burglary or motor vehicle theft and drug 
dealing. Alternatively, developers were 
characterised as offenders transitioning 
into professional armed robbery.
• Professional and persistent offenders 
were career robbers for whom crime 
was a part of their everyday life. These 
individuals engaged with greater levels 
of planning, more carefully selected their 
targets and used ‘serious’ weapons such 
as firearms. Due to the fact that robbery 
was used to support their lifestyle, 
professional robbers were more likely 
than other types of robbers to focus on 
high-yield targets (Matthews 2002).
Profiles and classifications of armed 
robbery that focus exclusively on offenders 
have particular use for police and other 
investigative agencies. For instance, profiles 
can be useful when there is a lack of eye 
witness or forensic evidence or a suspected 
offender (Hahn-Fox & Farrington 2012). 
However, focusing on the offender targets 
only one of the three elements specified 
by RAT. It is important to include the other 
two in order to implement more holistic 
approach to crime prevention. Further, 
shaping crime prevention initiatives around 
specific offenders is not always the most 
practical approach for armed robbery. For 
example, increasing the security within 
a post office (eg fly-up screens) may 
de-motivate an amateur or intermediate 
offender. However, the high cash flow 
will still make the location attractive to 
professional robbers who have experience 
circumventing these types of security 
measures. Similarly, it would be impractical 
for a grocery store to employ the same level 
of security as a bank, as it would impede 
the ability of the store to do business. It is 
therefore better to understand the unique 
characteristics of robberies as they occur 
in each location, as well as how they affect 
the offender. This would allow a greater 
tailoring of crime prevention strategies to 
the individual location or business and 
help create a more proactive approach to 
preventing armed robbery that embraces 
all aspects of RAT.
Method
The Australian Institute of Criminology’s (AIC) 
National Armed Robbery Monitoring Program 
(NARMP) was established in 2001 to examine 
trends and changes in armed robbery in 
Australia. NARMP receives quantitative 
state and territory police administrative data 
describing reported armed robbery victims, 
offenders and incidents. Although armed 
robbery can have negative consequences 
for anyone involved, for recording purposes, 
NARMP defines a victim as only the individual 
or organisation whose property was targeted. 
For example, an organisation will be listed as 
the only victim if only money from the till is 
stolen, despite an employee being ‘held up’.
Since 2004, in addition to the quantitative 
data, some police jurisdictions have supplied 
a sample of police reports pertaining to 
armed robbery. These jurisdictions include 
New South Wales, Queensland, South 
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Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania 
and the Australian Capital Territory. Not 
all jurisdictions supplied qualitative data 
consistently between 2004 and 2010, and 
the method of sampling used by police to 
select the cases is not known; however, 
the narratives that were supplied capture 
detailed qualitative information not contained 
in the quantitative data. This included 
victim and offender interaction, offender 
strategies and the sequence of events. 
This information has allowed researchers 
a unique opportunity to gain a greater 
understanding of the complex nature of 
armed robbery as it varies across location.
Initially, the full sample of 627 narratives 
held by the AIC as part of NARMP was 
coded using Microsoft Excel in order to 
identify broad patterns and trends.
The recording of qualitative information 
varied considerably both within and 
between jurisdictions. Some narratives 
provided a very detailed account of the 
robbery, while others were no more than a 
paragraph in length. This variation between 
narratives has limited the ability to make 
definitive statements regarding the trends 
and patterns. As a result, it is important 
to acknowledge that the absence of 
information did not necessarily mean it 
was not present in the incident; rather, it 
may not have been reported. Ultimately, 
locations were compared across the 
following 10 variables:
• type of victim—individual (person), 
organisational or mixed;
• number of offenders—single, pair, three 
or more;
• type of group (if more than 1 offender)—
professional or amateur;
• time of day—day (6 am–5:59 pm) or night 
(6 pm–5:59 am);
• offenders age—25 years and younger, 
older than 25 years, mixed age;
• alcohol and other drugs (AOD)—victim/
offender under the influence, AOD stolen, 
syringe used, no involvement;
• relationship victim/offender—unknown, 
recognised (no prior relationship), prior 
relationship (acquaintance/colleague), 
prior relationship (family/friend);
• motivation—cash focused, not cash 
focused;
• weapon—knife, firearm, bar/bat/blunt, 
opportunistic, syringe, mixed weapons, 
other; and
• weapon use—harm, threaten, neither, 
property damage.
Where applicable, the results of the Excel 
coding were compared with similar variables 
in the larger, quantitative NARMP dataset. 
Specifically, the patterns across locations 
were compared in both datasets in order 
to determine the representativeness of the 
qualitative sample. Importantly, there was 
a high degree of correspondence between 
the two samples across the majority of 
locations. The only location where there 
was divergence was post offices.
Based on the patterns identified through 
the initial coding scheme, locations were 
classified into four groups (see Table 1). 
Locations were grouped according to 
similarly in the patterns observed across 
the 10 variables.
Table 1 Locations of armed robbery and 
corresponding classificationsa
Classification Location
Private space Residential
Public space Street/footpath
Public transport (including taxis)
Private vehiclesa
Insecure 
business
Retail
Service stations
Newsagents
Takeaway stores
Grocery stores
Liquor stores
Private business/office
Chemists
Secure business Licensed premises (including 
hotels, pubs, nightclubs)
Post offices
Banking/financial institutions 
(including places of gambling)
a: Despite being privately owned, private vehicles showed a high 
level of congruency with other public locations. This was due to the 
location of the car during the robbery. Commonly, cars were 
parked in public car parks or on the side of the road
The 627 narratives were then further 
coded using qualitative analytical software 
NVIVO 10. After assignment to one of the 
four classifications, the narratives were 
coded line by line to highlight a number 
of broad themes including context (victim 
movements), initiation, offender exit, 
violence, threats and security presence. 
The primary aim of the thematic coding was 
to explore the nature of armed robbery in 
order to build a more comprehensive profile 
of each of the four categories.
Inferring characteristics, such as the level 
of planning or motivation, was difficult 
due to the absence of the offender’s 
perspective. As a result, across all four 
profiles, characteristics such as these 
were determined through the presence 
or absence of context-specific indicators. 
These indicators are discussed in each of 
the profiles below.
Results
Armed robberies against individuals
Private spaces
Armed robberies that occurred in residences 
were classified private because access to the 
location was severely restricted to members 
of the public. In total, 77 (12%) of narratives 
included in the final sample described an 
armed robbery in a private location.
The most common method by which 
offenders gained entry was through invitation 
from the victim. Offenders were often onsite 
prior to the robbery occurring (visiting) or 
knocked on the door and were admitted. 
For example:
[Victim] let [offender] in the house, when 
[offender] was in the hallway [offender] 
produced a pocket knife and said ‘Give 
me my fucking money’ and ‘If you don’t 
give me the money I’ll slit [witness’] 
throat’ (N199)
A minority of offenders gained entry through 
the use of deception.
A key distinguishing feature of robberies 
in private spaces was the involvement of 
offenders who were known to the victim, 
with the offender–victim relationship 
commonly described as an acquaintance 
or friend. Robberies by family members 
were rare. The fact that offenders were quite 
often known to the victims may also explain 
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their relative ease in gaining access to the 
locations (ie from knocking on the door). 
Offenders who were known to the victim 
often targeted specific property or amounts 
of cash. Conversely, the robberies also 
occurred in the context of a dispute over 
ownership or money as demonstrated in 
the following example:
Offender was brandishing an iron bar 
of some description and assaulted the 
victim with the bar…Offender snatched 
the victim’s handbag and car keys…
telling the victim then when [they] 
returned [the offender’s] property [they] 
could have [their] vehicle back (N207)
Disguises were sometimes used by 
offenders to mask their identity. However, 
the disguises were rudimentary—t-shirts 
or bandanas tied around the lower face 
were common.
The most common weapon used by offenders 
during armed robberies in private spaces was 
a knife (n=17; 22%). This finding is in line with 
broader patterns in armed robbery across the 
majority of locations. However, unlike armed 
robbery more generally, a high proportion of 
robberies in private spaces involved violence. 
Specifically, 55 percent of the narratives 
(n=42) made reference to violence. Further, in 
45 percent of the incidents (n=35), the victim 
sustained injury (14% sustaining serious or life 
threatening injuries). Weapon-based violence 
was common; however, it is interesting to 
note the way in which the weapons were 
used. While blunt weapons such as bars 
or bats were used to beat victims, stabbing 
or shootings were rare. Rather, when the 
offender was armed with a knife or firearm 
they used physical violence (punching, kicking) 
instead of the weapon to assault the victim.
Overall, the involvement of AOD was limited, 
being mentioned in less than 26 percent of 
narratives. However, where it was reported, 
commonly it was because the victim and/
or the offender were flagged as current or 
known users of illicit drugs. While offenders 
committing robberies in private spaces 
primarily targeted cash or specific items they 
knew to be on the premises, a common 
theme in cases involving AOD was the 
specific targeting of illicit drugs believed to 
be on the premises; for example, cannabis 
or morphine. In these instances, offenders 
committed the robbery with the specific aim 
of stealing the victim’s illicit drugs.
Public spaces
Since the inception of NARMP, public 
spaces such as the street/footpath, car 
parks, transport locations and open 
spaces have remained the most common 
locations for armed robbery (Borzycki & 
Fuller 2014). A total of 262 (41%) narratives 
included in the final sample described a 
robbery in a public location. Public spaces 
were characterised by having little or no 
restrictions on public access. This is an 
important distinction as it relates back to 
the notions of capable guardianship and 
target suitability proposed by RAT.
The most common incident of this type of 
robbery involved either one or two male 
offenders, armed with a knife, targeting a 
single, male victim. Although not as common 
as lone offenders, gangs of offenders were 
more frequent in public spaces than in any 
other location. Analysis of the narratives 
suggests that when gangs of offenders were 
involved, as well as using knives, weapons 
were also sourced from the immediate 
environment. Referred to as ‘opportunistic’ 
weapons, these weapons include items 
such as branches, rocks and broken glass.
In public spaces, planning was determined 
by the type of weapon use, the method of 
initiation and whether the offender actively 
attempted to avoid identification.
The majority of robberies committed in 
public places were characterised by a lack 
of planning and were therefore seemingly 
opportunistic in nature. Offenders most 
often used knives during armed robberies 
in public spaces; however, the second 
most common type of weapon was 
opportunistic. The use of these weapons 
is indicative of a low level of pre-planning 
because of their immediacy to the offender 
at the time of the offence.
The lack of strategies employed by 
offenders to avoid identification is also 
an indicator of the lack of planning that is 
characteristic of public armed robberies. In 
most instances, offenders did not attempt 
to hide their identity. For example, items 
of clothing commonly worn during public 
armed robberies included beanies and long 
sleeves; gloves, balaclavas and other face 
coverings were rarer.
The opportunistic nature of these types 
of robberies was further illustrated in the 
following narrative:
As the victim reached the intersection, 
[the offender] has run up and hit [the 
victim] in the back of the head with a 
rock and knocked [the victim] to the 
ground. The victim was fighting off the 
offender who was trying to pull [the 
victim’s] handbag away. [A witness] ran 
up and yelled ‘What the fuck are you 
doing?’ The offender disengaged and 
ran back along the street [they] had just 
walked down (N479).
The haphazard way the offender initiated 
and struggled with the victim is characteristic 
of a lack of planning. Offenders who pre-
plan their robberies are better able to control 
the victim, which in turn enables them to 
take the targeted property more efficiently. 
The offender in the previous narrative not 
only failed to control the victim but also did 
not take proactive steps (such as choosing a 
quieter time to commit the robbery) to avoid 
witness intervention.
Offenders targeted whatever property 
victims had or were likely to have on them 
at the time, with no specific aim. In over 97 
percent of all robberies in public spaces, 
offenders targeted cash. The next most 
common items targeted were electrical 
items such as mobile phones or personal 
music players; often stolen in tandem with 
cash or wallets. This meant that the takings 
were small as victims rarely carried large 
amounts of cash on their person.
Further, victims were targeted while in 
transit; for example, walking home or getting 
off a bus/train. AOD involvement was rare; 
being specifically mentioned in only seven 
percent of narratives (n=18). When it was 
noted, it was common for the victim to be 
under the influence of alcohol and on their 
way home from wherever they had been 
drinking. Unlike armed robberies in private 
spaces, there was no evidence to suggest 
offenders were targeting specific people. 
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Rather, the information suggests that these 
were ‘suitable’ victims; that is, an individual 
who is seen as an easy target because of 
their behaviour or other characteristics (ie 
age and gender; Johnson 2005).
Violence was still high compared with 
armed robberies that occurred in secure 
or insecure businesses, although not as 
high as in private locations. Of the 262 
narratives, 41 percent involved some form 
of violence. However, where violence was 
involved and injury sustained, the majority 
of victims only received minor injuries that 
did not require medical attention.
Armed robberies against 
businesses
Public perceptions often portray armed 
robbery as a crime primarily perpetrated 
against a business. Armed robberies 
against businesses better fit this profile 
of a ‘stereotypical’ armed robbery than 
those that occur in either public or private 
locations. However, analysis of the police 
narratives emphasised that the profiles of 
robbery varies between different types of 
businesses. Importantly, a key distinguishing 
feature is the actual or perceived level of 
security the business has employed. For 
example, the level of security employed 
by a bank or other financial institution can 
reasonably be expected to be more complex 
than that of a takeaway or grocery store. 
While small businesses such as these 
employ alarms, CCTV cameras and safes in 
order to prevent and minimise victimisation, 
when compared with banks or other high 
security locations, these premises have 
the appearance of being more insecure; a 
perception that may make them vulnerable 
to armed robbery victimisation.
Insecure businesses
In total, 238 (37%) narratives described a 
robbery at an insecure business. Groups 
of offenders rarely targeted insecure 
businesses. As with robberies in public 
places, the most common type of offenders 
were either single or pairs of males armed 
with knives. In almost all of the narratives 
describing armed robberies of insecure 
businesses, the offender approached the 
cashier or employee directly and made 
verbal demands for money. Further, in the 
majority of instances (n=212; 80%), the 
threatened person complied, handed over 
the money and the offender exited the 
premises on foot.
Violence during armed robberies of insecure 
businesses was rare. Less than three 
percent (n=7) of the narratives analysed 
involved violence towards employees of the 
store. This is likely to be due to the high level 
of compliance by business staff. Despite the 
absence of actual violence in most cases, 
offenders robbing insecure businesses 
frequently used threats of force or violence to 
ensure employee cooperation. In particular, 
threats to kill, maim or otherwise harm the 
employee were common. Examples of such 
threats include:
[H]and me your money or I’ll stab you in 
the face…hand it over now or your mum 
won’t recognise you (N169).
If you call the police I am going to come 
after you and I will hunt you down (N540).
Further, these armed robberies involved high 
levels of aggression, although the threats 
were not always as direct as those mentioned 
above. Equally common were offenders 
who made no statements of harm against 
the employee or reference to the weapon at 
all. For example:
[The offender] has then produced a 
silver coloured handgun, possibly a 
9mm, from underneath [their] jacket and 
told the victim to get the money slowly, 
while holding the firearm in [their] right 
hand (N122).
Yet these implied threats were often just 
as effective at controlling as a direct threat. 
Many of the narratives included information 
that indicated that employees felt the same 
level of fear from an implied threat compared 
with a direct threat. In fact, victim compliance 
was just as high regardless of whether the 
threat was direct or implied.
In 64 percent of the narratives analysed 
(n=168), businesses were victimised 
between 6 am and 11:59 pm. Given the 
diverse range of businesses included 
in this category, the wide victimisation 
timeframe is to be expected. Insecure 
businesses were most commonly robbed 
during or near the end of business hours. 
For instance, newsagents are open early 
in the morning, while some takeaway and 
grocery stores may be part of the late-night 
economy. The majority of these robberies 
took place when there were very few 
people in the store or around closing time, 
when the absence of guardians such as 
customers is more pronounced. In addition, 
the choice to rob a location at close of 
business may correspond with the time of 
day when cash was most accessible; for 
example, tills being counted or money 
being transported to the bank.
There is, however, some indication that 
compared with robberies of secure 
businesses, those committed against 
insecure businesses are less planned. 
For example, offenders who committed 
robberies against insecure businesses 
did not always make serious attempts 
to disguise themselves. While hoods 
and caps were common, the majority of 
offenders did not use any type of disguise, 
choosing to leave their faces uncovered. 
Further, the use of gloves (an important 
tool to avoid identification through 
fingerprinting) was rare.
However, some offenders did engage in a 
number of strategies to avoid identification. 
Chief among these was avoiding directly 
touching any property within the store. For 
example, many offenders had the employee 
or cashier place the money in the bag to 
avoid contact with the counter or till. Some 
offenders even made cursory attempts to 
‘wipe down’ the scene after they left. The 
other common strategy was to try and avoid 
facing CCTV cameras.
Secure businesses
Banks and financial institutions, licensed 
premises (including pubs and hotels), 
gaming rooms and post offices are 
among the locations considered to be 
secure because of the perceived level and 
complexity of the visible and assumed 
security measures they employ. These 
locations are often characterised by the 
utilisation of strong environmental crime 
prevention, onsite security and strict cash 
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handling procedures. High cash flow and 
large onsite cash holdings necessitate 
these measures. In total, 50 narratives (8% 
of the total sample) described an armed 
robbery in a secure business.
Potentially due to the complexity of security 
measures, single offenders rarely targeted 
secure businesses, while pairs or groups of 
three or more offenders/accomplices were 
common and mentioned in approximately 
70 percent (n=35) of narratives describing 
an armed robbery at a secure business. 
Groups of offenders often worked 
collaboratively, taking on different roles. For 
example, working in pairs, one offender may 
be placed in charge of controlling witnesses 
and employees, while the other removes the 
cash or property. The combination of one 
offender and a lookout was also common:
[Offender 1], in possession of a firearm, 
approached the cashier booth located 
at the bar and demanded money be 
placed into a black bag [they were] 
holding…[Offender 2], waited near the 
door at which they entered (N361).
Firearms were the most common weapon 
present during armed robberies of secure 
businesses, ranging from pistols and 
handguns to sawn-off shotguns. This runs 
contrary to the other types of robbery 
where knives were the most common 
weapon used by offenders. In nearly all 
narratives describing a robbery of a secure 
business, the offender was armed. The 
most common scenario was for all offenders 
to be armed with firearms. Less commonly, 
one offender was armed with a firearm and 
one armed with a knife.
Despite the seriousness of the weapons 
present, injury and violence was rare. Of 
particular importance, none of the 50 
narratives describing an armed robbery 
involved an employee, victim or witness 
being shot. In only one incident was the 
firearm discharged and it was aimed at 
the ceiling, indicating the intent was not 
necessarily to harm. When violence did 
occur, witnesses or employees were 
physically assaulted—either punched or 
knocked down. However, severe violence, 
where employees were seriously beaten, was 
not present in any of the narratives analysed.
Offenders exclusively targeted large 
amounts of cash. Of the 50 narratives, 
the largest amount stolen was around 
$50,000. However, the median amount 
stolen by offenders who targeted secure 
businesses was between $1,000 and 
$6,000. This money was rarely sourced 
from just one place within the business 
and many offenders demanded money 
from the tills as well as various safes.
The knowledge of the business’ security 
procedures suggests that offenders engaged 
in planning, including prior surveillance. For 
example, in a robbery where the offenders 
stole $50,000, the cash was stolen in 
less than four minutes. The offenders 
successfully navigated the presence of a 
security guard and staff, security barriers 
and multiple safes. This would have required 
substantial planning in order to accomplish 
this within the timeframe. Other indicators of 
planning include the presence of a firearm 
and the use of disguises.
Discussion
The characteristics of the four profiles are 
summarised in Table 2. Importantly, the 
results support findings from previous 
exclusively offender-focused profiles. 
For example, robberies that occurred in 
secure businesses were most commonly 
perpetrated by groups of offenders armed 
with firearms whose knowledge of the layout 
and security indicate a high level of pre-
planning. This corresponds with Matthews 
(2002) professional armed robbers, while 
his amateur and intermediate robbers are 
likely to be found across the locations. 
The disorganised nature of robberies in 
public spaces may particularly indicate the 
amateurish nature of these incidents.
Further, the profiles presented in this paper 
highlight the importance of broadening the 
focus to include an understanding of the 
vulnerabilities associated with location and 
victim. This is approach is supported by 
RAT, which states that crime occurs when 
there is a suitable target, a lack of capable 
guardianship and a motivated offender.
Specifically, while exclusively offender-
focused profiles provide valuable insight 
into the planning and motivation behind 
armed robbery, the profiles presented in 
this paper go further and illustrate how 
these factors interact with the location. 
For example, these profiles show how 
a pre-existing relationship between 
an offender and victim may facilitate 
a robbery in a private space or how 
victims are most vulnerable to armed 
robbery in public spaces when they are 
in transit. These findings support the 
notion that preventative approaches 
should account for differences, depending 
on the characteristics of the locations 
in which armed robberies occur. Doing 
so will ensure that practitioners avoid 
implementing an all-encompassing, ‘one 
size fits all’ solution.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight 
how armed robbery varies depending on the 
Table 2 Summary of location profiles
Dimensions Private Public spaces
Open public 
spaces
Businesses
‘Insecure’ ‘Secure’
Prior relationship X
Targeted victim X X X
Violence X X
Injury X
Weapon—firearm X
Weapon—knife X X X
Planning X X
Opportunistic theft X X
AOD X
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location in which it occurs. It is not intended 
to proscribe crime prevention solutions; 
however, the profiles do provide information 
around vulnerabilities that may inform future 
strategies. For example, where armed 
robberies in private spaces are concerned, 
there would seem to be little that can be 
offered by way of additional preventative 
advice. Indeed, the high prevalence of 
violence in such incidents may suggest that 
such offences are more often motivated by 
pre-planned aggression and intimidation 
than by the acquisition of property. 
Supporting victims and identifying those who 
may be vulnerable are two possible ways the 
impact of armed robbery in a private space 
could be mediated.
Alternatively, armed robberies in public 
spaces may best be addressed through a 
multi-pronged approach that incorporates 
the public, as well as police agencies. 
The results of UK-based initiatives that 
have tackled this problem are available to 
the general public (see Matthews 1996; 
Stockdale & Gresham 1998; Tilley et al. 
2004). For example, results indicate that 
publicity that raises awareness among 
potential victims regarding activities that 
may increase their vulnerability (eg walking 
alone in secluded areas after dark) is valuable 
(Tilley et al. 2004). In addition, environmental 
measures can be employed in particularly 
vulnerable locations. Examples include 
ensuring public spaces have appropriate 
lighting to improve natural surveillance and 
are well-maintained and free of environmental 
debris such as unnecessary shrubs or trees 
(Tilley et al. 2004).
For insecure businesses, Gill (2000) 
recommends implementing prevention at 
the organisational, situational and social 
levels. While strategies implemented at the 
social level include new laws and political 
commitment, organisational and situational 
initiatives are more attainable for the small 
business. These include management 
techniques such as appropriately training 
and vetting staff and situational measures 
such as controlling entry and exit points 
to the premises or access to the property 
itself through the installation of time delay 
safes (Gill 2000). Other strategies such as 
high counters or fly-up screens may also 
effectively limit an offender’s accessibility 
(Mayhew 2000).
In their research into effective crime 
prevention strategies for convenience 
stores and takeaways in the United States, 
Exum et al. (2010) noted that a one-size-
fits-all approach was not effective. Stores 
had to be evaluated (and prevention 
strategies developed) on their own unique 
set of circumstances and characteristics. 
However, it is important to note that despite 
being particularly vulnerable to armed 
robbery, small businesses are often the least 
financially capable of implementing effective 
crime prevention strategies. Therefore, 
as well as tailoring approaches to each 
location, cost must also be considered an 
important factor.
Finally, this research also highlights 
important knowledge gaps in terms 
of understanding the nature of armed 
robbery. Importantly, robberies that occur 
in residences show a markedly different 
profile to those that occur across the 
other three locations. The involvement 
of drugs, the level of violence and the 
relatively high proportion of incidents 
involving offenders who were known to the 
victims are characteristics that stand out in 
residential armed robberies compared with 
other robbery types. This type of robbery 
may more closely resemble other types of 
interpersonal violence such as assault. If 
this is the case, then victims of residential 
armed robberies may require different 
types of support compared with other 
robbery victims.
In conclusion, the profiles presented in 
this article are not intended to perfectly 
describe every robbery that occurs in each 
location. Based on thematic analysis of 
627 police narratives held by the AIC, the 
profiles capture common characteristics 
of armed robberies, including how the 
offender interacts with the environment, 
the property targeted and the influence 
of other factors such as alcohol and illicit 
drugs. It is intended that these profiles help 
inform future crime prevention initiatives, 
as well as contribute to a more considered 
understanding of armed robbery in Australia.
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